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I. Introduction
It is commonlythoughtthat one of the primarychannelsthroughwhich moneyhas an
impactupon aggregatedemand and hence pricesand outputis throughits effectsupon
investment
system,an increasein moneyaffects
spending.In a bare-bonesKeynesian-type
investmentprimarilyby reducingmarketinterestrates. In a Monetarist-type
system,in
have
more
direct
an
in
effects
additionto this indirecteffect, increase moneymay
upon
out of moneyinto investment
investmentspendingthroughdirectsubstitution
goods.' In
The change
eitherapproachtheinitialeffects
maybe reinforced
throughacceleratoreffects.
in
turn
alterthe
will
in aggregatedemandgeneratedby thechangein investment
spending
alter
also
investment
fiscal
actions
levelsof outputand prices.Expansionary
may
spending
by raisinginterestrates. However,this negativeimpactof expansionaryfiscalactionson
investmentmaybe mitigatedor even offsetiftheexpansionaryfiscalpolicyraises income
are strong.The neteffectof theexpansionaryfiscal
on investment
and accelerationeffects
is
thus
actionon investment
spending
ambiguous.
The aim of this paper is to examine empiricallythe impactof monetaryand fiscal
policyactionson investmentspending,and to therebyprovideevidenceon how monetary
and fiscalpolicyeffects
are transmitted
to themacroeconomy.
However,ratherthanfocusing
*An earlierversionof thispaperwas presentedat theSouthernEconomicAssociationmeetingsin November
1984.The authorsthankCharlesHegjiforhishelpfulcomments.
mechanisms
forchangesin moneyembeddedin thegeneral
1. As notedby B. Friedman[7] thetransmission
identical.In bothmodelsa changein the
equilibriummodelsof Tobin[22] and Brunner-Meltzer
[2] are essentially
thatultimately
the
and setsoffachainofportfolio
substitutions
affect
ofmoneyupsetsassetmarketequilibrium
quantity
realsectoroftheeconomy.
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upon total investmentspending,the impactsof monetaryand fiscalactionson residential
and consumerdurablesexpenditures
fixedinvestment,
investment,
construction,
inventory
are analyzedseparately.Consumerdurableexpendituresare includedsincethedecisionto
purchaseconsumerdurables is conceptuallysimilarto the investmentdecisionof firms.
Thus, we present"disaggregated"evidenceon the relationshipsamong monetarypolicy,
fiscalpolicyand the major componentsof investmentspending.A reducedformmethodapproachto analyzingtheimpact
ologyis used in theempiricalanalysis.One reduced-form
is
the
estimation
of St. Louis-typeequations
of thepolicyvariableson investment
spending
each
is
of
investment
on
distributed
in which
spending regressed
lags of a monetary
type
policyvariableand a fiscalpolicyvariable.This methodhas been employedby Rose [16; 17]
to analyze the effectsof monetaryand fiscalpolicyactionson, among otherthings,conand varioustypesof investment
sumerdurablesexpenditures
expenditures.However,even
this
has
been
frequently
employedto analyze the macro
though
singleequation approach
effectsof monetaryand fiscalpolicyactions,the approach has been subjectedto much
an alternativeapproachis employedin
criticism[4; 8; 9; 15]. Based upon thesecriticisms,
thispaper.
The alternativereduced-form
than
approachused in thispaper,whichis less restrictive
the single-equationapproach,is thevectorautoregressive
modelingtechniqueproposedby
Hsiao [11; 12]. The vectorautoregressive
(VAR) approachcan be thoughtofas a systemof
a
reduced-form
with
equations
separateequationforeach variablein thesystem.The initial
modelsthatcontainseparateequations
analysisin thispaper is based upon three-equation
fora particulartypeof investment
spending,a monetarypolicyvariable,and a fiscalpolicy
thefirstsetof modelsrepresents
variable;accordingly,
disaggregatedVAR analoguesto the
traditionalSt. Louis equation. UnlikethetraditionalSt. Louis model,however,no a priori
of the
assumptionsare made about theexogeneityof thepolicyvariables.The specification
modelsprovidesevidenceon theGranger-causalrelationsamongthevariablesofthesystem,
and theestimatedsystemscan be used to provideestimatesofthestrength
oftheserelations
based upon variancedecompositionscomputedfromthe systems.The variancedecompowillbe discussedlater.
sitionsand theirinterpretation
Whilethethree-variable
VARs providean interesting
comparisonto thetraditionalSt.
Louis framework,
recentworkhas called intoquestionempiricalresultswhichexcludethe
Sims [20] has recentlyshownthatthe additionof an interest
rate of interest.Specifically,
rateto a vectorautoregressive
systemthatcontainsmoney,a pricevariable,and an output
measure has significant
implicationsforthe role of moneyshocks in alteringpricesand
link
output.Based upon Sims's resultsand upon thefactthatinterestratesare an important
in the Keynesianview betweenchangesin moneyand investmentspending,fourvariable
systemsin whichan interestrateis added to thesystemsdescribedabove are also analyzed.
As describedin moredetail later,the additionof an interestrateallows inferencesabout
whethermost of the impactof a change in moneyon investmentworksthroughinterest
ratesor whether,
in additionto thisinterestratechannel,directsubstitution
betweenmoney
and investment
modelsallowat leastinformal
Further,thefour-variable
goods is important.
assessmentas to whetherthe relativepotencyof monetarypolicy,which is a standard
St. Louis-typeresult,is robustin thepresenceoftheinterestrate,whichprovidesthetraditionalKeynesianlinkbetweenthereal and financialsectors.
The modelingtechniqueis discussed in section II, and the threeand fourvariable
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modelsare presentedin sectionsIII and IV, respectively.
Furtherdiscussionofthemodelsis
foundin sectionV, and thelast sectioncontainsconcludingcomments.
II. EstimationProcedure2
The methodologyused to estimatethe trivariatemodelsanalyzedhere is the vectorautoregressivetechniquesuggestedby Hsiao [11; 12] and extendedby Caines, Keng,and Sethi
[3]. The VAR modelingtechniqueis employedratherthana singleequationor a structural
model approach,since the VAR modelsavoid imposingpotentiallyspuriousa prioriconstraints(such as, forexample,exogeneityofthemonetaryvariablein theinvestment
equations)on themodel.The VAR techniqueemployedinvolvestheuse oftheGranger-causality
definition
in conjunctionwithAkaike'sfinalpredictionerrorcriterionto imposerestrictions
on theestimationof theVAR. The techniqueallowseach variableto dependupon a subset
of the variablesin the systemand allows fordifferent
lag lengthsforeach variablein each
equation.
The VARs estimatedin the mannerdescribedabove differfromthe unconstrained
VARs estimatedby Sims [19; 20], Fischer[6], and Dwyer [5] in whicheach variabledepends upon all othervariablesin the systemwiththe same lag length.One problemthat
thecommonlag by one
emergesin theestimationof a Sims-typeVAR is thatlengthening
increasesthenumberofparametersto be estimatedbythesquareofthenumberofvariables
and thusrapidlydepletesthe degreesof freedomavailable forestimation.The degreesof
in estimatingSims-typesystemssincethelag length
freedomproblembecomessignificant
the lag forone or moreof the
mustbe keptgenerousin orderto avoid under-specifying
estimates.Further,thereis no reasonto
variablesand therebyavoidingbiased coefficient
believethatthesame lag lengthis appropriateforall variablesin each equation.
The use of VARs to analyzeour data setis motivatedby Fischer's[6, 402] observation
are ". .. a convenientwayofsummarizing
thatvectorautoregressions
empiricalregularities
and perhapssuggestingthepredominantchannelsthroughwhichrelationswork."Furthermore,Sims [21, 138],in a discussionof his VAR results,notesthat". . . carefulattentionto
the historicaldata exertsan importantdisciplineon what can be plausiblyassertedabout
thewaytheeconomyworks."However,theVAR is a reduced-form
techniqueand it is thus
based upon VAR results,to distinguish
difficult,
hypotheses.
sharplyamongstructural
The Lucas critiqueis also potentiallyapplicable to the VAR technique,and it is
assumed in this paper thattherewere no changesin policyregimesover the estimation
to
period. As Sims [21, 138] notes,"The U.S. postwardata containsenoughinformation
of theconditionaldistribution
of thefutureof major macrogive a usefulcharacterization
economicaggregatesgiventhepast. Althoughthereis evidencethatthisstructurechanges
overtime,thereis also evidencethatit does notchangesuddenly,so thata modelfitto the
whole postwarperiod as if its parameterswere fixedover thatwhole period is not badly
biased because of parameterchanges."
theestimationoftheVAR is based upontheuse ofstationSince thetheoryunderlying
thedata to
the
first
in
data
step the Hsiao procedureis to suitablytransform
ary
[12; 18],
The specifictransformations
used in thisstudyare discussedin thenext
achievestationarity.
2. The materialin thissectionis takenprimarily
fromMcMillin-Fackler
[14].
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to emphasizethatstationary
data are used. Details ofthe
section;at thispointit is sufficient
Hsiao procedureare providedin McMillin-Fackler[14] and willnot be discussedhere.
III. Disaggregated"St. Louis" Equations
Presentedin thissectionare modelsofthemajorcomponentsofinvestment
spendingwhich
VAR analoguesto thetraditionalSt. Louis methodology.
are disaggregated,
Quarterlydata
fornominalconsumerdurableexpenditures,
nominalfixedinvestment
nomiexpenditures,
nal inventoryinvestmentspending,the M1 definition
of the moneystock,nominalhigh
and Moody'sAAA corporatebond rateare used to
government
employment
expenditures,
estimatethe variousmodels.The corporatebond rateis employedas the relevantinterest
ratesince,presumably,it is a longtermratethatis mostrelevantforexpenditureson longlived assets.3MI is chosen since it is the moneystock definition
that receivesthe most
attentionin monetarypolicydiscussions.High-employment
government
expendituresare
employedsincethismeasureis designedto be purgedof feedbackfromthecurrentstateof
the economyto government
expenditures.Variationsin this measureare thenthe conseof
in
quence changes spendingprograms.4
As pointedout in sectionII, specification
and estimationof the VARs requiresstatestsdescribedin Ali-Thalheimer[1] and a simpletest in
tionarydata. The stationarity
whichthetransformed
serieswas regressedon a constantand timewereemployedto determine what transformations
were requiredto achieve stationarity.
In the lattertest,if the
coefficient
on timewas statistically
further
transformations
weredeemednecessignificant,
of log transformation
was requiredto
sary. For durable expenditures,a firstdifference
achieve stationarity
whilefortheotherinvestmentmeasuresand formoneyand highemof log transformation
was requiredto obtain
ploymentexpenditures,a second difference
series.In thecase ofthecorporatebond rate,itwas foundthata firstdifference
of
stationary
of thisserieswas stationary.5
log transformation
In theVARs estimatedhereonlylaggedvaluesofthesystemvariablesappear as righthand variablesin thesystem'sequations.FollowingHsiao [12], it is assumedthatany conare reflected
in thecorrelation
oferrortermsacrossthesystem's
temporaneousrelationships
maximumlikelihood(FIML) is
equations. Based upon thisassumption,full-information
used to estimatethesystem.The specification
of each modelis checkedbyover-and underthe system,estimatingthe modifiedsystemsby FIML, and thencarryingout likelifitting
hood ratiotestsof theadequacyofthespecifiedsystemagainsteach proposedmodification.
The likelihoodratiostatisticsare computedas -2 log (L"/L") whereL' is the maximized
likelihoodof the constrainedsystem(the modifiedsystemforunder-fits
but the specified
construction
3. A modelforresidential
wasalso estimated
market
expenditures
usingthesecondary
yieldon FHA
as therelevantinterest
rate.The resultsare notqualitatively
fromthesystempresented
different
hereusing
mortgages
the AAA rate.We do notreportthe modelusingthe FHA ratedue to thegenerally
of FHA
different
characteristics
mortgages
comparedwith,say,conventional
mortgages.
4. Data forresidential
construction
non-residential
and durablegoods
construction
expenditures,
expenditures,
aretakenfromtheSurveyofCurrentBusiness.Data forM 1Iand high-employment
arefrom
expenditures
expenditures
the Federal ReserveBank of New York,and data forthe AAA bond rateand thesecondarymarketyieldon FHA
are fromtheCitibankdata tape.
mortgages
testsuggested
thepresenceofnon-stationary
seasonalvariations
intheAAA bondrate.As
5. The Ali-Thalheimer
weretakenbeforefurther
a consequence,seasonaldifferences
transformations
wereexamined.
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and Lu is the maximizedlikelihoodof the unconstrainedsystem(the
systemforover-fits)
and the modifiedsystemforover-fits).
This statisticasympspecifiedsystemforunder-fits
distribution
n
of
where
n is thenumber
follows
a
with
freedom,
chi-square
degrees
totically
of imposedcontraints.
Usingtheestimationproceduredescribedin sectionII, thethreevariableVAR model
forfixedinvestment
estimatedovertheperiod 1959:1-1979:46, is
expenditures,

FII

ai3(L)

aA2(L)

0
a2?(L)
M1,= Fa1l(L)
a422(L)

EHE,

0

a33(L)J

FI,

M

EHE,

al I el

+ a2

a3]

+

e2

(1)

[e3

of the log of fixedinvestmentexpenditures,
Ml is the
whereFI, is the second difference
of thelog ofthenarrowmoneystock,EHE is theseconddifference
of the
seconddifference
the
coefficients
on
of
k
lag
log highemployment
expenditures,ai, represents
variablej in
terms.
As
Sims
the
the
are
error
has
noted,it is
equation i,
ei
[19]
a, are constants,and
to interpret
the individualautoregressive
coefficients
because of thereducedform
difficult
are not reportedherebut are availableon request.
natureof themodel;thesecoefficients
the systemand then
The adequacy of thismodel is testedby over-and under-fitting
conductinglikelihoodratiotestsofthemodifiedsystemsagainstsystem(1). These testsare
in the followingway: hypotheses(a)-(c) impose
presentedin Table I and are interpreted
on thenon-zerooff-diagonal
elementsand hypotheses(d)-(f) ease thezero
zero restrictions
in (a)-(c) are
restrictions
on thezerooff-diagonal
elements.We see thatthezero restrictions
of system(1)
rejectedwhilethetestsof hypotheses(d)-(f) suggestthatthezero restrictions
are appropriate.Testsof hypotheses(g)-(k) suggestthatshorterlags on therespectivevariables are inappropriate.Tests of hypotheses(1)-(s) suggestthatextendingthe lags on the
in the system.
non-zeroelementsof the systemnevergeneratesa significant
improvement
Althoughotherhypothesistestsare possible,the testsreportedin Table I indicatethat
ofthethreevariablesunderstudy.
system(1) appearsto be an adequate VAR representation
The implicationsof system(1) willnow be discussed.As Granger[10] proved,a zeroelementsof a systemlike (1) indicatesthe absence of direct
elementin the off-diagonal
fromone variable to another.Thus we see that both Ml and EHE
Granger-causality
Granger-causeFI. However,thereappears to be feedbackfromFI to Ml, which may
representFederal Reserve concernfora key elementin the businesscycle,spendingon
plant and equipment.However,neitherFI nor Ml feedsback into our measureof fiscal
policy,EHE.
of the Granger-causalrelationscan be
Sims [21] has recentlyarguedthatthestrength
measuredfromvariancedecompositions.Variancedecompositions(VDCs) showthe proto itsowninnovations
portionofforecasterrorvarianceforeach variablethatis attributable
and to shocks to the othersystemvariables.As Sims [21, 131] notes,"A variablethatis
optimallyforecastfromits own lagged values will have all its forecasterrorvarianceaccountedforbyitsowndisturbances."
Thus ifeitherMl or EHE explainonlya smallportion
thisas evidenceof a weak Grangerof the forecasterrorvarianceof FI, we will interpret
causal relation.
rate
6. The sampleperiodendsin 1979becauseof a switchbytheFederalReservein Octoberfroman interest
operatingguideto a reservesorientedoperatingguide. Strictlyspeaking,the sampleshouldend in 1979:3,butthe
had no effect
on theresults.
additionalobservation
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Table I. Testsof Model Adequacy,EquationSystemIa
Hypothesis

(a) al2(L) = 0
(b) al3(L) = 0
(c) a,,(L) = 0

Likelihood Ratio Statistic

16.60*
6.94**
9.76**

a 3(L)

1.74

(e) a4 (L)

0.74

(f) a42(L)

0.32

(d)

(g)

10.74***

all~(L)

(h) a42(L)

10.46**

(i)

aI (L), aa2(L)

20.32***

(j)

a22(L)

9.10*

(k) a' (L)

8.74*

(1)

a;, (L)

1.96

(m) a> 2(L)

0.18

(n)

a 3(L)

1.34

(o)

a ,(L), a8,(L), a 3(L)

2.10

(p) a ,(L)

0.86

a 62(L)

0.70

(q)

(r)
(s)

a(L),

a6(L)

a'(L)

1.98
1.42

at .025 level.
= significant
at .01 level.
** = significant
at .005 level.
*** = significant

a.*

inthemanner
described
forsystem
Variancedecompositions
bySims
(1) aregenerated
is
acrossequations
ofresiduals
thecorrelation
that,ingeneral,
[20].Thismethodrecognizes
Because
fashion.
ina particular
theVDCs thevariablesareordered
notzero.In calculating
whena variablehigherin theorderchanges,
residualcorrelation,
of thecross-equation
to
variableslowerintheorderareassumed change.The extentofthechangedependsupon
ofthevariableshigherintheorderwiththoselowerintheorder.Becauseof
thecovariance
ofthevariables
so thatitisusefultoexamine
totheordering
thistheVDCs maybe sensitive
theVDCs basedon severalorderings.
inTableII, part1.Theorderings
forsystem
Variancedecompositions
(1) arepresented
ofmonetary
and fiscalpolicy
theprimary
reflect
focusofthepaperon theeffects
reported
on investment.
The orderings
are:(1) Ml, FI, EHE, and (2) EHE, FI, and Ml. The VDCs
A twenty
inTableII, I.A. (first
andTableII, 1.B.(secondordering).
arepresented
ordering)
to
worked
out.
of
the
be
in
to
the
is
allow
horizon
order
system
dynamics
quarter
employed
in anysubstantive
However,theresultsforthetwenty
way
quarterhorizondo notdiffer
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Table II. VarianceDecompositions-ThreeVariableSystems:TwentyQuarterHorizons

1. System:FI, MI, EHE
A: Ordering:MI, FI, EHE
Relative
Variationin
MI
FI
EHE

MI
78.9
30.4
3.0

2. Sistem:INV, MI, EHE
A: Ordering:MI, INV, EHE

Explainedby
EHE
FI
20.4
51.4
2.8

0.7
18.2
94.2

Relative
Variationin

MI

MI
INV
EHE

98.0
21.6
0

Explainedby
INV
EHE
1.6
74.4
1.4

B: Ordering:EHE, FI, MI

B: Ordering:EHE, INV, MI

Relative
Variationin

Relative
Variationin

EHE
FI
MI

Explainedby
FI
MI
98.3
1.6
0.1
20.6
59.6
19.8
2.6
20.1
77.3

EHE

.3. Siystem:RE, MI, EHE

A: Ordering:MI, RE, EHE

Relative
Variationin
MI
RE
EHE

Explainedby
RE
EHE
MI
100
0
0
10.2
83.6
6.2
98.7
1.3
0

EHE
INV
MI

Explainedby
INV
MI
100.0
0
0
10.6
70.4
19.0
1.9
4.2
93.9
EHE

4. Siystem:DE, MI, EHE

A: Ordering:MI, DE, EHE
Relative
Variationin
MI
DE
EHE

MI
89.8
38.2
1.2

Explainedby
DE
EHE
6.0
57.4
0.4

B: Ordering:EHE, RE, MI

B: Ordering:EHE, DE, MI

Relative
Variationin

Relative
Variationin

EHE
RE
MI

Explainedby
RE
MI
100
0
0
5.2
85.3
9.5
1.6
17.2
81.2
EHE

0.4
4.4
98.6

EHE
DE
MI

4.2
4.4
98.4

Explainedby
DE
MI
100
0
0
4.8
25.2
70.0
9.5
4.0
86.5
EHE

fromVDCs forfour,eight,twelve,and sixteenquarters.As a consequence,theseVDCs are
not reportedhere but are available on request.We see thatregardlessof theorderingthe
variance in Ml and EHE is almost completelyexplained by theirown innovations.In
orderingA, moneyinnovationsexplain about 30% of the varianceof FI; thisproportion
drops to about 20% in orderingB. EHE explains about 18% of the variance of FI in
orderingA and about 21% in orderingB. Ml thusexplainsno less of the variancein FI
thandoes EHE; it appears thattheeffects
of Ml on FI are at least as importantas EHE in
fixed
investment.
determining
The specificationof the three-variable
model forinventoryinvestmentis discussed
next. The non-zeroelementsof the INV model, analogous to those of system(1), are:
aI (L), a12 (L), a13 (L), a22 (L), and a33 (L). To conservespace, theresultsof testsof model
adequacy are not reportedherebutare availableon request.
For theINV system,the Granger-causality
implicationsof the systemare somewhat
different
thanfortheFI system.Specifically,
both M1 and EHE Granger-causeinventory
investmentand both are freeof feedbackfromspendingon inventories.
The lack of feedback fromINV to bothMl and EHE is further
evidencedby thefactthat,forthetwenty-
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all ofthevariance
quartervariancedecompositions(Table II, 2), forbothorderingsvirtually
in bothMl and EHE is explainedbytheirowninnovations.In addition,in orderingA, Ml
innovationsexplainabout 22% of thevariancein INV whilein orderingB thispercentage
declines only marginally,to 19%. EHE, in contrast,explains substantiallyless of INV
variance,rangingfromabout4% in orderingA to about 11% in orderingB. Thus,it appears
thatMl shocksdominateEHE in explainingvariability
in INV.
The specifications
of thethree-variable
modelsforresidentialexpenditures(RE) and
consumerdurablesexpenditures(DE) are now discussed.The non-zeroelementsof the
modelforRE are: a 1'(L), a2(L),
s ofthe
1
13 (L), a22(L), and
a33(L). The non-zeroelements
aI3
Tn4
128
3element
model forDE are: a(L),
order
to
conserve
(L), an2(L), a3(L), a(L), a2(L),n
onse
space,theresultsofthetestsof modeladequacysimilarto thosein Table I are notpresented
herebutare availableupon requestfromtheauthors.Based upon thesetests,each modelin
judged adequate.
For RE, theGranger-causality
ofthesystemare identicalto thoseforINV.
implications
RE are Granger-caused
bybothMl and EHE whilebothMl and EHE are freeoffeedback
fromtheothersystemvariables.Fromthetwenty-quarter
variancedecompositions(Table
see
that
for
of
in
we
both
most
the
variance
bothMl and EHE is explained
II, 3),
orderings,
In
Ml
their
own
innovations.
innovations
by
orderingA,
explainabout 10.2 percentof the
variancein RE while in orderingB thispercentagedropsonlyslightlyto 9.5%. Ml thus
explains substantiallyless of the variancein RE thanit does forFI. EHE, regardlessof
ordering,explainsverylittleof thevariationin RE; again, itappearsthatmonetaryshocks
have a greatereffecton RE than do shocks to EHE. VDCs forfour,eight,twelve,and
sixteenquartersagain do notdiffer
fromthosein Table II. These resultsare
substantatively
also available on request.
The Granger-causality
implicationsof thesystemforDE are quitesimilarto thosefor
fromDE to Ml. However,fromthe variance
FI in thatthereis directGranger-causality
decompositionsin part4 of Table II we see thatregardlessof theordering,innovationsin
DE explainverylittleof thevariancein Ml. The Granger-causality
fromDE to Ml thus
to
be
and
as
is
free
of
feedbackfromeither
before,money essentially
appears
quite weak,
DE or EHE. EHE are also freeof feedbackfromeitherDE or Ml. For orderingA, the
amountof variationin DE explainedby Ml is 38% whileEHE explainsonly4.4% of the
variationin DE. In orderingB, Ml shocksexplain25% ofthevariationin DE whileshocks
to EHE explainonly5%.
The resultsof theanalysisabove supporttheresultsofthehighly-aggregated
St. Louistypemodels thatmonetarypolicygenerallydominatesfiscalpolicyin accountingforunanticipatedmovementsin various investmentcategories.In only one case (that of fixed
investment)mightit be argued that fiscalpolicy is as importantas monetarypolicy in
explainingthe variabilityof the key sub-componentof investmentexpenditures;in the
otherstherelativeimportanceof monetarypolicyis muchmorelikely.
IV. Disaggregated"Keynesian"Equations
modelsare of interest,we recall
Althoughthe resultsof the analysisof the three-variable
thatin the bare-bonesKeynesianview of the monetarytransmissionmechanism,interest
rates are the key link betweenchangesin moneyand investmentexpenditures.We also
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recall that Sims [20] foundthat additionof an interestrate to a systemthat previously
excludedsucha ratelessenedtheabilityof monetaryshocksto explainvariationsin output
and prices. Further,the Sims analysisis performedin the absence of any explicitfiscal
policyvariablesso thatthe relativeimportanceof monetaryand fiscalpolicies,controlling
fortheinterestrate,is stillan open question.For thesereasonswe nowturnto an analysisof
fourvariableVARs in whichan interestrateis added to each ofthethreevariablesystems
previouslydiscussed.These fourvariablemodelsprovidesome evidenceon thedistinctions
betweenthe standardtextbookKeynesianview of the monetarytransmissionmechanism
and thestandardmonetarist
conceptionofthisprocess.If thestandardtextbookKeynesian
view is correct,we would expectto finddirectcausalityfrommoneyto interestratesand
frominterestratesto investment
withno directcausalityfrommoneyto investexpenditures
ment.In themonetarist
as
view,we wouldexpectdirectcausalityfrommoneyto investment
wellas indirectcausalityfrommoneyto interestratesand frominterestratesto investment.
Based upon the estimationtechniquedescribedearlier,the fourvariableVAR model
forfixedinvestment
spendingestimatedovertheperiod 1959:1-1979:4 is

6 a34(L)
4 a'4(L)
SFI, a(L) a62(L)

FI,

a

el

MI,

a2

e2

03
a,,(L) a22(L)a23(L)

0

MI,

a 2(L)

0

AAA

AA(L)
a21(L)

EHE, L 0

0

a

-+

a3

+

e3

EHEJ a4J Le4

(2)

a43(L)4(L)J
are as previouslydefined,AAA is thefirstdifference
of log trans-

whereFI, Ml, and EHE
formation
oftheAAA corporatebond rate,ai, represents
thek lag coefficients
on variablej
in equation i, the a, are constants,and the ei are errorterms.The individualcoefficient
estimatesare available on request.The adequacy of the model is assessed in the manner
describedearlier.These likelihoodratio testsindicatethat system(2) appears to be an
of thefourvariablesunderstudy.In orderto conservespace, these
adequate representation
testresultsare notgivenherebut are availableupon request.
From (2), we see that Ml, AAA, and EHE directlyGranger-causeFI. In addition,
thereis indirectGranger-causality
fromMl to FI since Ml Granger-causesAAA. An
of thispatternis thatMl affectsFI by alteringinterestratesand by direct
interpretation
out of moneybalances into FI. Likewise,thereis indirectGranger-causality
substitution
fromAAA to FI sinceAAA Granger-causesMl. This lattercausalitypatternmayreflect
Federal Reserveconcernforfinancialmarketstability;severalreactionfunctionstudiesalso
provideevidenceof such a concernby the Federal Reserve.See, forexample,McMillinBeard [13] and thestudiescitedtherein.In additionto directGranger-causality
fromMl to
we
see
that
also
AAA.
in
Variations FI, by affecting
AAA,
FI
directlyGranger-causes
aggregateoutput,alter moneydemand, and this variationin moneydemand would be
fromAAA to
expectedto affectAAA. We also findthatthereis directGranger-causality
EHE, and, since Ml and FI Granger-causeAAA, thereappears to be indirectcausality
fromthesetwo variablesto EHE. Thus, unlikethethree-variable
systems,thereappearsto
be feedbackfromat least some of the systems'variablesto Ml and EHE. The strength
of
thisfeedbackis assessed next.
Variancedecompositionsforsystem(2) are presentedin Table III, part 1. Two orderings are employed;one orderingis Ml, FI, AAA, and EHE whilethe second orderingis
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VariableSystems:TwentyQuarterHorizons
Table III. VarianceDecompositions--Four

1. Siystem:
FI, MI, AAA, EHE
A: Ordering:MI, FI, AAA, EHE
Relative
Variationin
MI

FI
AAA
EHE

MI
68.6

21.4
20.1
0.1

2. System:INV, MI, AAA, EHE
A: Ordering:MI, INV, AAA, EHE

Explainedby
FI AAA EHE
14.1

16.0

6.6
54.9
12.1 66.3
2.6
0.3

1.3

17.1
1.5
97.0

Relative
Variationin
MI

INV
AAA
EHE

MI
77.1

23.1
21.5
0.6

Explainedby
INV AAA EHE
8.6

64.8
8.3
2.0

14.3

B: Ordering: EHE, FI, AAA, MI

B: Ordering: EHE, INV, AAA, MI

Relative
Variationin

EHE

Relative
Variationin

EHE

EHE

98.6

EHE

100.0

FI
AAA
MI

Explainedby
FI AAA MI
1.4

0

0

25.1 64.3
3.0
7.6
2.6 14.5 70.1 12.8
1.7 24.2 18.9 55.6

3. Siystem:
RE, MI, AAA, EHE
A: Ordering:MI, RE, AAA, EHE
Relative

Variationin

MI

MI
RE
AAA
EHE

74.1
26.5
30.2
0.8

AAA EHE

18.3 7.6
70.2
3.3
16.4 53.4
6.2
2.4

0
0
0
90.6

Relative

EHE

RE

Relative

Variationin
MI
DE
AAA
EHE

Relative

Variationin

EHE
96.0

5.8

6.1

0.1

EHE

83.8

AAA

1.1
1.8

7.0
11.3

68.3
14.5

23.6
32.4

AAA

MI

0

0

Explained by

DE

AAA EHE

5.3
2.8
88.4
3.5
28.9 47.0
4.3 19.8
41.2 18.4 35.2 5.2
11.4
1.3
2.5 84.8

MI

2.4

0

MI

AAA

RE

EHE

94.1

Explained by

0

59.4 14.3 20.3
3.3 77.1 16.7
17.8 11.1 70.3

B. Ordering: EHE, DE, AAA, MI

B. Ordering: EHE, RE, AAA, MI

Variationin

6.0
2.9
0.8

Explainedby
INV AAA MI

4. System:DE, MI, AAA, EHE
A: Ordering:MI, DE, AAA, EHE

Explained by

RE

IN V
AAA
MI

0

12.1 0
70.2 0
1.2 96.2

7.7

DE

MI

Explained by

DE

1.2

AAA
1.7

MI
1.1

21.2

52.0

8.7

18.0

6.3
9.0

21.0
4.5

38.3
12.7

34.4
73.9

EHE, FI, AAA, and M1. The VDCs are presentedin Table III, L.A (firstordering)and
horizonare
Table III, L.B (second ordering).Again, onlythe resultsfora twenty-quarter
the
same
as
shorter
of
since
these
results
were
at
horizons
four,eight,
substantially
reported
twelve,and sixteenquarters.We see thatin orderingA, Ml shocksexplain about 21% of
the variationin FI, but thisproportiondropsto about 8% in orderingB. Thus, when the
interestrateis includedin the system,we findthatthe percentageof totalvariationin FI
to one-halfthatexplainedbyMl in thethreevariable
explainedbyMl dropsto two-thirds
system.This resultis similarto thatin Sims [20] althoughthe systemvariablesare quite
FI system,fiscalpolicyappearsto be at leastas important
As in thethree-variable
different.
as monetarypolicyin explainingthevariabilityof fixedinvestment
spending.Further,the
alter
the
of
on FI. We also see
of
the
interest
rate
does
not
EHE
impact
appreciably
presence
thatMl shocksexplain a muchlargerfractionof the variationin AAA regardlessof the
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orderingofthevariables;fiscalpolicy,however,has littleapparentimpacton interestrates,
an interesting
resultin lightof recentdiscussionabout the role of government
financein
the
financial
markets.
influencing
of the fourvariablemodelsforinventoryexpenditures,
The specifications
residential
expenditures,and consumerdurablesexpenditureswill now be discussed.The non-zero
elementsoftheINVmodel are: a (L), a12(L), a43(L), a2(L), a3(L), a, (L)(L),
a32(L),
5
3
4
3
a3(L),
The
non-zero
of
the
model
for
elements
RE
are:
a
2(L), a13(L),
a43(L), and
a44(L).
a1l(L),
1
4
3
6
12
4
9
a22(L), a23(L), a31(L), a32(L), a33(L), a43(L), and a44(L). The non-zeroelementsof the
model for DE are: aI,(L), a 2(L), a43(L), a'4(L), a',(L),
a22(L),
a23(L),
a31(L), a3(L),
7
4
I
96II
4
3
12
a33(L), a43(L), and a44(L). As before,testsof model adequacy suggestthateach model is
adequate,and theresultsof thesetestsare available upon request.
The Granger-causality
resultsimplicitin theINV and RE systemsareidentical.Among
themoreinteresting
are theresultsthat:(i) EHE does notGranger-causeeitherINV or RE,
eitherdirectlyor indirectly;
(ii) bothMl and AAA exertindependentinfluences
uponINV
and RE; and (iii) bidirectionalcausalityexists betweenAAA and Ml but thereis no
fromhighemployment
Granger-causality
spendingto the interestrate. Similarto thecortrivariate
the
estimated
models,
responding
systemsincludingtheinterestratetendto supa
St.
conclusion
port disaggregated Louis-type
regardingthe relativeeffectsof monetary
and fiscalpolicieson keycomponentsof investment
expenditures.
The conclusionreached above regardingthe relativepotencyof monetarypolicy is
reinforcedby examiningthe variancedecompositionresults;see Table III, parts2 and 3.
For the inventoryinvestmentsystem,innovationsto Ml accountforat least 20% of the
varianceof INV, regardlessof the selectedordering,whileEHE explainsat most6%. For
theRE system,Ml explains26% of thevariabilityin residentialspendingin orderingA, a
proportionwhichdeclinessharplyto about 8% in orderingB. However,even whenEHE is
positionedfirstin the ordering,it onlyexplains an apparentlynegligible2% of RE fluctuations.
The Granger-causality
resultsforthe DE systemare identicalto thoseof theFI system. Ml and AAA directlyGranger-causeDE; however,althoughEHE did not directly
Granger-causeeitherINV or RE in thesefour-variable
systems,thereis directGrangercausalityfromEHE to DE. One explanationofthisresultis thatDE are moreresponsiveto
variationsin nominalincomegeneratedbychangesin EHE thanare FI or RE. In addition
to thedirectcausalityfromMl and AAA to DE, thereis again indirectcausalityfromMl
to DE throughthe effectsof MI on AAA and fromAAA to DE throughthe effectsof
AAA on Ml. There is also directGranger-causality
fromDE to AAA as well as fromMl
to AAA. Likewise,DE directlyGranger-causesMl as does AAA. Finally,thereis direct
causalityfromAAA to EHE as wellas indirectcausalityfromMl and DE to EHE operaton AAA.
ing throughtheireffects
As before,thestrength
of thesecausalityrelationsis assessed byexaminingVDCs for
the DE system.These VDCs are reportedin Table III, 4.A and 4.B. Ml again explainsa
substantialfractionof thevarianceof DE and AAA regardlessof ordering.However,the
ofthevariationin DE explainedbyMl fallswiththeadditionoftheinterestrate
proportion
to the VAR model. Feedback fromtheothersystemvariablesto Ml appears to be weak,
althoughin the second orderingAAA explains about 13% of the variationin Ml. EHE
explainsabout 20% of thevariationin DE regardlessof ordering.This resultis also quite
fromtheVDCs forthethreevariableDE system.However,unlikeMl, theaddition
different
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of theinterestrateto the systemraisedtheproportionof thevariancein DE explainedby
EHE. EHE does not explain muchof the variancein AAA, a resultsimilarto the other
systems.Feedbackfromtheothersystemvariablesto EHE appears,as in theothersystems,
to be weak.
The resultsforour four-variable
modelssuggesta numberof conclusions.First,as in
thethreevariablemodelsin sectionIII, monetarypolicycontinuesto dominatefiscalpolicy
in termsof explainingdisaggregatedinvestment
expenditures
despitetheexplicitinclusion
of the interestrate. Second, even in the presenceof the interestrate, moneyinvariably
contributesto the explanationof the major componentsof investment,
a resultconsistent
withthe"monetarist"
transmission
mechanism.Third,as in thethree-variable
systems,high
of investment
employmentexpendituresare relativelyunimportantin the determination
spending.

V. Conclusions
The aim ofthispaper has been to assess theimpactof monetaryand fiscalpolicyactionson
investment
The initialanalysiswas conductedwiththree-variable
vectorautoexpenditures.
investregressivesystemswhichcontaineda categoryof investmentexpenditures--fixed
mentexpenditures,inventoryinvestmentexpenditures,residentialexpenditures,or consumerdurable expenditures--alongwiththe narrowmoneystock and high-employment
withina four-variable
vector
government
Subsequentanalysiswas performed
expenditures.
frameworkwhichadded an interestrate to the three-variable
vectorautoautoregressive
regressions.
In all of the three-variable
and four-variable
vectorautoregressive
systems,we found
that M1 Granger-causesinvestmentexpenditures.The variance decompositionsbased
upon these systemssuggesta nontrivialeffectof M1 on investment.High employment
expenditureswerefoundto Granger-causeinvestmentin all of the three-variable
systems
and in thefour-variable
systemsforconsumerdurableexpendituresand fixedinvestment.
However,thevariancedecompositionssuggestthatM1 typicallyhas muchstrongereffects
upon investmentthan do high employment
expenditures.These resultsgenerallysuggest
thatany causalityfromhighemployment
expendituresto investmentexpendituresis relativelyweak.
It should also be noted thatwhen the interestrate was added to the systems,direct
was observedas was indirectcausalityfromM1 to investcausalityfromM1 to investment
mentthroughtheeffects
ofM1 on theinterestrate.This resultis suggestivethatthebroader
view of the transmissionmechanismin whichthereis directsubstitutionout of money
balances into investmentgoods as well as an effectoperatingthroughmarketratesof interestis moreappropriatethantheviewin whichmonetaryactionsaffectinvestment
spending solelyby alteringmarketinterestrates.
Finally,we notethatalthoughin severalofthesystemsthereis directas wellas indirect
fromtheothersystemvariablesto moneyand highemployment
Granger-causality
expenditures,thisfeedbackis veryweak. The variancedecompositionssuggestthat most of the
variationin both Ml and highemployment
expendituresis explainedby theirown innovations.
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